By Errol E. Harris
From the Preface:
The function of this observation is to render Hegel’s good judgment intelligible to the uninitiated and to dispel the varied misconceptions that have collected round it and round Hegel's philosophy typically. No try out has been made to track traditionally the advance of the common sense via its quite a few types, or to offer a biographical account of Hegel’s philosophical improvement. This has been performed by way of different writers with whom i've got no wish to compete. My item has been simply to know the kernel of Hegel’s notion and to penetrate, as far as i will, the obscurities of his writing, in addition to, the place valuable and manageable, to give an explanation for and type out a few obvious anomalies within the association of the fabric.
Read or Download An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel PDF
Similar logic & language books
Whilst this e-book used to be initially released in 2006, Epistemetrics was once now not as but a scholarly self-discipline. with reference to medical info there has been the self-discipline of scientometrics, represented by means of a magazine of that very identify. technological know-how, notwithstanding, had a monopoly on wisdom. even though it is one among our most vital cognitive assets, it isn't our just one.
The 1st full-length examine of self-reference and paradox in legislations, this publication will intrigue and tutor an individual drawn to legislations, good judgment, philosophy, or political thought. heritage indicates that self-amendment - for instance, using a constitution's amending clause to amend itself - is average; criminal research exhibits it to be lawful, no matter if (as a few logicians have alleged) it truly is self-contradictory; and philosophical research indicates it to be foundational for legality.
The current selection of seventeen papers, such a lot of them already released in overseas philosophical journals, offers either with concerns within the philosophy of common sense, the philosophy of arithmetic, the philosophy of language and epistemology. the 1st half comprises serious tests and a little deviant renderings of the paintings of 2 seminal philosophers, Frege and Husserl, in addition to of the younger Carnap and Kripke.
This publication is meant either as a textbook in symbolic common sense for
undergraduate and graduate scholars and as a treatise on the founda-
tions of good judgment. a lot of the fabric was once constructed in an under-
graduate path given for a few years in Yale college. The
course used to be basically a primary direction in good judgment for college kids interested
in technology. Many replacement units and techniques of presentation
were attempted. these incorporated listed below are the ones that appeared most
Additional info for An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel
In fact, Currie coincides with Sluga in almost every point and, thus, his book can be seen almost as a revised edition of Sluga’s book. 67 In his reinterpretation of Frege’s views on number in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Currie goes so far as to assert68 that for Frege numbers are creations of our faculty of reason. In such a case, since Frege considers numbers as objective as the Black Sea, maybe Currie should also render the Black Sea as a creation of our faculty of reason. With respect to Frege’s ‘Der Gedanke’, Currie goes so far as to assert that Frege was trying to refute a work of Mach of 1902.
Moreover, a concept does not have to be obtained by means of abstraction from objects, since in that case there would not be concepts under which nothing falls. In the case of concepts, one asks whether something falls under it, but such a question is nonsensical with respect to objects. Thus, there exists an essential difference between concepts and objects. There is also a corresponding essential difference between properties of objects and properties of concepts. Properties of objects can be traits of concepts under which the objects fall.
3 Ibid. 4 Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, §3. 2 23 does not imply any sort of Kantianism in Frege, in a similar fashion as the recognition of Kripke’s distinction5 between the pairs (necessity/contingency) and (a priori/a posteriori) does not entail any belief in Kripke’s thesis that strict proper names are rigid designators and that identity statements between those presumed rigid designators are examples of necessary a posteriori statements. Other important distinctions for Frege’s whole philosophy that are already present in his youth work are the distinction between the content of a judgement and the recognition of its truth, and that between concepts and objects.