Boethius: On Aristotle on Interpretation 4-6 by Boethius, Andrew Smith

By Boethius, Andrew Smith

Boethius (c. 480-c. 525) used to be a Christian thinker and writer of many translations and works of philosophy, so much famously the Consolations of Philosophy that have been most likely written while he used to be lower than apartment arrest, having been accused of treason through King Theoderic the nice. He was once for this reason carried out. On Interpretation is the second one a part of the Organon, as Aristotle's amassed works on good judgment are identified; it bargains comprehensively and systematically with the connection among good judgment and language. In his first six chapters, Aristotle defines identify, verb, sentence, assertion, confirmation and negation. Boethius preserves misplaced interpretations by way of of the best previous interpreters, Alexander and Porphyry, and the defence of the work's authenticity opposed to feedback. He documents the assumption of Porphyry that Aristotelians think in 3 sorts of identify and verb, written, spoken and psychological, in different phrases a language of the brain. Boethius' remark shaped a part of his undertaking to deliver wisdom of Plato and Aristotle to the Latin-speaking global. It had nice impact, last the normal creation to On Interpretation during the Latin heart Ages.

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Additional resources for Boethius: On Aristotle on Interpretation 4-6

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For there is no further term in the proposition. And so if someone wants to resolve the proposition into its terms, he does not resolve it into ‘is’, but into ‘man’ and ‘just’. And there will be two terms: the subject ‘man’ and the predicate ‘just’, while ‘is’ which is predicated as joined and as a joined third, is to be understood more correctly as a quality of the proposition, as I have said, rather than as a term. And it is for this reason that he says name or verb; for he said that ‘is’ is added as a third name to show us that the first two are, of course, ‘man’ and ‘just’, and he said ‘verb or name’ because verbs are also names.

Therefore the simple particular negation ‘not every man is just’ also follows the infinite universal affirmation ‘every man is not-just’. Here too the simple particular negation follows the universal affirmations, both privative and infinite, but they are not convertible. For since the universal negation ‘no man is just’ does not follow the simple particular negation ‘not every man is just’ (for if it is true that not every man is just, it is not true that no man is just) while the simple universal negation agrees with and signifies the same thing as the privative universal affirmation, the privative universal affirmation ‘every man is unjust’ does not, therefore, follow the simple particular negation ‘not every man is just’, just as the universal negation did not follow the same particular negation.

For this is what he means by for ‘is’ and ‘is not’ are here added to ‘man’ and ‘not-man’. For if ‘just’ is predicated of man and ‘is’ and ‘is not’ is added to ‘just’, it will also be added to man, as we said. Alexander thinks that this reading ought to be emended and should be put as we first Translation 27 cited it ‘for “is” and “is not” are here added to “just” and “not-just” ’. But whether we accept one reading or the other the whole sequence of ideas is clearly set out. For neither need be altered.

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